In Media Res
—Review Essay
Stephen Crocker. Bergson and the Metaphysics of Media (2013, Palgrave Macmillan, London).
Christopher Vitale. Networkologies: A Philosophy of Networks for a Hyperconnected Age—A Manifesto (2014, Zero Books, Washington).
Stephan Crocker’s Bergson and the Metaphysics of Media and Christopher Vitale’s Networkologies: A Philosophy of Networks for a Hyperconnected Age—A Manifesto are works that offer us two recent additions to I want to refer to as the intellectual genre of ‘crisis philosophy’. By ‘crisis philosophy’ I mean a tradition of philosophical writing that takes as its chief concern a critique of the historical and metaphysical foundations of modernity. Amongst other things, this genre pays especially close attention to the role of ‘modern science’ in the formation of modernity, and the former’s role in the increasing de-deification of nature and the rise of abstract formal systems for nature’s interpretation, as arose out of the intellectual revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Given the incredible efficacy of the increasingly abstract formal systems that developed over this time, writers in the genre outline the rise of the modern mode of thinking as involving the deflation of traditional metaphysical questions, questions that began to appear suspicious for being obscurantist and mystical. Generally speaking, the perspective that crisis philosophy offers presents the state of western thought in general as greatly atrophied due to the disavowal of what that perspective sees as the philosophical grounds of modern science. That is to say, the ‘crisis’ that is taken as the object of philosophical study for a ‘philosophy of crisis’ appears to be the very rise of modern thought as both a manifestation of earlier Ancient (more often than not Greek) and Christian traditions, and as a forgetting or passing-over of the particular questions that made the admittedly flawed metaphysical traditions of the ancients and medieval Christians so significant. Such a shift runs alongside the historical shifts that sees science become an increasingly technologically mediated and specialized set of disciplines that largely ignore what could be posited as the fundamental questions of the human condition.
Perhaps the exemplar of this genre would be Edmund Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, originally published in German in 1954 though written around the late nineteen-thirties. This text outlined the rise of modern science up to and including the early twentieth century as a period of remarkable increases in technical sophistication at the expense of an ‘indifferent turning-away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity’ (6). For Husserl, the dominance of reason in modern thought hinders the ability for modern scientific traditions to engage with the fundamental questions to be found in previous epochs of thought (9). For Husserl, the modern study of humanity, history, God, ethics and all else, emerges as seemingly inextricably bound to the question of reason, and, as such, those questions which possess a ‘higher dignity’ than that pertaining to the empirical sciences become lost to a study of the ‘universe of mere facts’ (ibid.). Since Husserl felt at the time that ‘positivism, in a manner of speaking, decapitates philosophy’, he claimed that there was a need for a renewal and transformation of philosophical thought, which could arise only through a historical and critical consideration of the thinking of the west (17-8). While his version of the ‘crisis’ is not reproduced exactly in the writings of the genre’s other proponents—such as Martin Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, published a year before Husserl’s Crisis in 1953, or Michel Henry’s Barbarism, published in France in 1987—Husserl nevertheless provides us with a set of themes and objectives which help to characterise the genre. Such characteristics include a critical view of modern reason, aided by an attentive reading of the developments of ancient and medieval thought; an engagement with the problem of the diminishment of philosophy’s traditional role as the broader science or rigorous study of ‘that which is’; and an attempt to locate signs of a renewal and transformation of the very philosophical tradition itself. It is in taking all three of these themes front and centre that Crocker’s and Vitale’s respective works appear to be new additions to the genre of ‘crisis philosophy’.
Both Crocker’s and Vitale’s books are greatly similar in their positing of the problems of modernity as signaling a present opportunity in contemporary thinking. That is to say, for both writers, modernity reveals a missed opportunity for the emergence of a properly non-hegemonic and non-dominating form of thought that could have emerged from out of modernity, had a reductionist and rationalistic form of scientism not installed itself instead. Indeed, both authors locate the possible catalyst for the emergence of a counter-discourse to modern scientific reason within the emergence of modern mass and networked media forms—such as radio, cinema, television, and the Internet. For both Crocker and Vitale, although they each emphasize different forms, the capacity of modern forms of mediation to reveal the extent to which mediation has always facilitated the rise of meaning, communication, novelty etc., opens the contemporary thinker up to the possibility of approaching anew the fundamental relationship between entities in a way that is less stratified, hierarchical, and domineering, thereby pointing towards the possibility of ushering in a thinking that is more concerned with the supplementary, the collaborative, and the networked.
This is to say that, for both Crocker and Vitale, once modern forms of media have transformed the world by increasingly bringing the question of mediation to the fore through forms of communication technology, the purported centrality of ‘immediate’ terms like meaning, the human, or even matter can be questioned and critiqued. For Crocker it is the rise of modern media forms that presents the very possibility of moving beyond the rigid and mechanistic thinking of modernity and towards a more rigorous questioning of the ontological status of mediation itself (Bergson, 64-5). Quoting the now famous twentieth century media theorist Marshal McLuhan, Crocker asserts that in the modern world we ‘live in three dimensions even if we continue to think on single planes’ (63). In comformity with the conventions of ‘crisis philosophy’, Crocker proposes a rejection of the modern attempt to overcome mediation by way of ‘better’ forms of technology—technologies that are increasingly ‘immediate’, or that can bring us closer to states of simultaneity or ‘real time’—and an attempt to radically think anew the question of mediation through a re-engagement with Bergson’s metaphysical philosophy (5-9). Similarly, Vitale argues that the destruction of ‘most human paradigms and world views’ was symptomatic of the rise of modernity and that, concomitant with this process of destruction was the ‘death of philosophy’, that is to say, the end of philosophy as a universal and unifying science (Networkologies, 76-77). For Vitale, however, the collapse of metaphysics and of philosophy as a potentially unifying science is not to be met as simply one historical fact amongst others in the narrative of the ascent of technological science, but is instead to be lamented as the failure for modern thought to truly grasp a ‘holistic’ approach to thinking entities, the world, and ourselves. Like Crocker, Vitale finds in the rise of media networks, and in their systemic study by way of ‘complex systems science’, a means of rethinking fundamental ontological questions, and the very status of philosophy, along lines that privilege the relational, the horizontal, and the holistic or non-reductive (21-3). As Vitale states,
networked times call for networked means. This project therefore will not simply philosophize about networking, or apply traditional notions of what philosophy might mean to networking. Rather, it will work to rethink philosophy as networking, to produce a philosophy of networks, in all senses of these terms. (10)
However, where these two texts differ radically is in the specific approach they take to the question of mediation, or, put differently, how they attempt to mediate mediation through the development of their texts. Of course there is nothing unusual about two authors differing in terms of the kind of philosophical projects they work towards. However, what we find in Crocker’s and Vitale’s work are reflections of two overlapping and yet distinct trends within contemporary continental philosophy more broadly speaking. While Crocker’s text develops out of a critical engagement with Bergsonian philosophy—looking not only at Henri Bergson’s own works but also at figures who were influenced by or show an affinity with Bergson’s ideas (for Crocker, Gilles Deleuze, Marshall McLuhan, and Walter Benjamin)—Vitale’s work is an ambitious attempt at speculative philosophy, a reworking of fundamental ontology through the guiding concept of the network. Whereas Crocker attempts both to reappraise Bergson with regards to his place within the contested philosophical lineage of the twentieth century, and to show the possibility of using Bergson radically to rethink our conventional relationship with the concept of mediation, Vitale aims to open up an entirely new space for thought through what is, at times, a rather eclectic mix of contemporary science, continental philosophy, and critical theory. Therefore, while both texts reject the scientistic approach to mediation that posits any mediating term or concept as an obstacle to be overcome, the two writers invoke quite different philosophical traditions in order to do so. Indeed, it may be that any limitations we ultimately find in these two impressive contemporary theoretical works are the result, effectively, of the limitations of the genre of crisis philosophy itself and its commitment to modernity as a lost opportunity that must be accounted for in a revitalization of the present tradition. Whether this revitalizing is done by way of a championing of Bergson’s metaphysics of mediation, or by branching out into new forms of speculative ontology, it is the implicit sense of modern thought as being uniquely deficient that drives the argument.
A considerable part of Crocker’s project involves attending to the ways in which Bergson’s thought can help to overcome the perceived shortcomings of both the ancient and modern conception of time so as to open up the question of mediation itself. As Crocker states, for some, and especially major and rival figures of the continental tradition such as Heidegger, Bergson is seen as a romantic figure whose ‘dualistic vision of time’ as either ‘static “now points”’ or an ‘undifferentiated continuum’ offers only the possibility of nostalgically looking for some immediate experience of life (Bergson, 112-3). But on Crocker’s account, whereas at times Bergson does seem to gesture nostalgically towards the need for renewing a non-mechanistic and thoroughly qualitative sense of time as duration—for example, in his earlier works such as Time and Free Will—the later Bergson has a more complicated relationship to the mechanistic thinking that emerged alongside modern science (Bergson, 122). As Crocker states, ‘Bergson does not want to return us to some pre-scientific mind-set’ but, instead, views the emergence of modern scientific thought as having not carried us ‘far enough’ away from received notions of unity (ibid.). For Bergson, then, both the ancient conception of time as an immutable continuum and the modern conception of time as a set of discrete divisions of an otherwise natural unity preclude the possibility of grasping time as radically novel and open, that is to say, as being a qualitative duration that is prone to rupture and transformation (121-2). Accordingly, for Crocker there is a need to engage with Bergson not as a romantic champion of the pre-modern, but rather as a fundamentally modern thinker who attempted to provide a new account of time as open and creative.
Crocker locates such an account of time in Bergson’s discussion of mediation, interval, and breakdown or rupture—a discussion that, on Crocker’s account, allowed Bergson to avoid reducing time to a diachronic or synchronic structure as it allowed him to open up the thinking of time to the ‘intervals’ through which these two levels participate (122). As Crocker states, ‘human existence is then properly intervallic and “chronogenetic”, or constitutive of the structure of time in which it occurs’ (87). This is to say that the future and the past, rather than belonging to some kind of unified continuum, are always mediated by the temporal and intervallic character of human existence, and, therefore, that time can always be ‘organized into different economies’ than those that prevail (ibid.). However, to get at the emergence of different economies of time Crocker must emphasize another side of Bergson’s work, a Bergson of rupture and fracture as opposed to the Bergson of continuous and vital duration. Crocker argues that Bergson’s later work needs to be emphasized for its ‘desire to escape the dualism that reduces the body to either a docile, controlled machine, or a pure unencumbered life force’ (128). Crocker argues that Bergson wished to avoid affirming either a reductionist view of life as a merely physical and mechanical structure, or the mystical positing of life as vital force (130-1). Since, for Bergson, if ‘there is no immediate relation to life’ then philosophy must attempt to grasp the intervallic and intermediate space for thought from which the aforementioned dualism can be bypassed (ibid.). Crocker finds such a revealing of the intermediary and intervallic in Bergon’s discussion of a broad range of commonplace experiential ruptures or breakdowns such as ‘déjà vu, dreams, misrecognition, aphasia, false starts, memory failure and […] laughter’ (133). He argues that Bergson, through meditations on the ruptures and breakdowns that occur by way of these aforementioned experiences, reveals the co-constituted and dynamic character of commonplace binary oppositions, such as life versus machine, signal versus noise, and sense versus nonsense (139). Once it is understood that ruptures and breakdowns of sense, message or idea are in some sense conditional for the possibility of these aforementioned phenomena, it becomes possible to rethink the significance of mediation; rather than as a stumbling block in the way of a possible perfection of life, mediation, and perhaps more specifically its breakdown, is approached by Bergson as the possibility for the emergence of a radically different approach to thinking ourselves, the world, and the entities in it as being co-constituting, reciprocal, and always already mediated.
It is this affirmation of Bergson’s commitment to finitude as an intractable and vital condition for life that places Crocker’s book firmly within what is now received as the post-Heideggerian tradition of continental philosophy. Indeed, the rather scant three-page conclusion to Bergson and the Metaphysics of Media dedicates a great deal more of its succinct summation of the overall argument to Heidegger’s reading of Sophocle’s Antigone in the nineteen-thirties than to any of Bergson’s work. For Crocker, Heidegger finds in Antigone’s account of humanity the possibility for a greater affirmation of the finite and mediated structures of existence than can be found in the modern world (Bergson, 159). Therefore, in re-positioning Bergson amongst thinkers who, like Heidegger, embrace the pathos of existential finitude, and in thereby emphasizing in that work the study of breakdown and rupture over the conventional focus on vital continuum and duration, Crocker ultimately arrives at a reaffirmation of one of the key tenants of the ‘crisis philosophy’ genre. This is not done simply by emphasizing the revealing made possible by the ruptures and breakdowns that must occur due to the finite nature of life itself, but moreover by showing that philosophy can find its contemporary value in being mediated by what are largely considered to be non-philosophical practices, technologies, and phenomena, such as laughter or film—a theme that is eminent in Heidegger’s late work, albeit in the form of an affirmation of poetry, sculpture, and painting. So, while Crocker’s text offers an admirable defense of Bergson in the wake of contemporary critiques of the philosophical vitalism with which he is often associated,1 his text is caught between a desire to champion the works of Bergson and an attempt to provide us with a thinking that emerges from ‘out of the middle’, so to speak, taking forms of mediation such as cinema, music, and laughter as being no more or less fundamental than any other term, be it God, man, or matter.
It is in this sense that Crocker’s text sits uneasily with its attempt to privilege a non- or at least less-stratified approach to thinking the world and our relation to it than one might find in much modern natural science or analytic philosophy. Indeed, the text’s preoccupation with Bergson’s affinity with the figures Deleuze, McLuhan, Benjamin, and Heidegger inhibits an already short book’s capacity for engaging with the non-philosophical phenomena it deems to be so rich. In other words, while the importance of various sites or events of mediation are affirmed in Crocker’s text, such an affirmation comes under the purview and direction of the overall significance of the Bergsonian corpus, and, as such, the actual mediation of thought via the forms of laughter, cinema, and music cannot but be pushed, in some sense, to the margins. Following Crocker’s argument, the proper name Bergson should be added to the series of proper names—Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard—that signify a heterogeneous philosophical practice of mediating philosophy via the non-philosophical. Yet by beginning with the Bergsonian corpus such a thinking cannot help but begin with the primacy of philosophical ideas, thereby subordinating non-philosophical ideas, practices, and media to the authority of a certain tradition of continental philosophy. Consequently, while his text does gesture towards a thinking of mediation, perhaps too much time is dedicated to thinking through the importance of such a move at the expense of allowing this gesture to unfold in greater complexity.
It is in this sense that Vitale’s ‘Networkological’ project is certainly distinct from Crocker’s, insofar as the former presents a mediation of the metaphysical tradition of western philosophy by eastern religious concepts, a variety of scientific disciplines, and other forms of ‘non-philosophical’ thought. Through the metaphysical password ‘network’ Vitale hopes to open thought to the possibility of overcoming its hierarchies and stratifications and to begin the project of connecting and reconnecting different disciplines for the purpose of fostering stability and betterment for all entities. Vitale himself best summarizes the grandeur of this new form of thought when he states that, ‘at the cusp of dream and reality, networks are a potentiality in the world for a world that yet could be’ (Networkologies, 219). Furthermore, what such a statement reveals is the awkwardness of Vitale’s project when it comes to the traditional conception of ontology, insofar as that project seems to be an attempt to answer fundamental ontological questions whilst acknowledging the various philosophical decisions—philosophical leaps of faith as opposed to an axiomatic presentation of thought’s foundation—that must be made in order for such a speculative project to get off the ground. The theory of networks that Vitale provides in his text is thus presented, on the one hand, as an ontological account of an external metaphysical real, and, on the other, as something like a work of hyperstition.2
In other words, while Vitale’s work has many of the features of conventional ontological systems it also admits to being fundamentally groundless, a mere text amongst others that can only have philosophical or cultural import by way of its capacity to establish links or to network with other texts. As Vitale states, the ‘networkological’ project does not
pretend to have pure or axiomatic foundations, or the fantasies of certainty which often accompany these […] there are no suppositionless, pure vantage points from which we could give ourselves a secure foundation. For any attempt at thinking always starts from where we find ourselves, in media res. (83-4)
For Vitale, networks reveal both the manner by which philosophy should be pursued in the future and the fundamental ontological structure of reality. Conventional ontological questions of being or substance are replaced by Vitale with an attempt to interlink philosophy with a maddening number of auxiliary disciplines—as evinced in the sheer proliferation of disciplines subsumed under the banner of networks, including, but not limited to, psychology, theology, economics, mathematics, science, erotics, aesthetics, politics, critique, deconstruction—in order to produce an ontological thinking that is governed by two maxims: everything is networked; and all networks must move towards greater states of robustness for the suffering and violence of human history to be finally overcome. Vitale argues that an emphasis on networks is concomitant with a broader ‘mediology’ or a study of mediation as being an unavoidable and quasi-foundational term in our understanding of reality (144). Rather than God, Man, or Being holding the central position in an explanation of the ontological structure of reality, Vitale holds that all terms that could be introduced into an ontology must be affirmed as relational, medial, and networked. He states that ‘any aspect shared by networks can be seen as a form of mediation, or betweenness, and hence, as an interface or media device’ (ibid.). Accordingly, no one term can be used in order to understand the ontological structure of reality. Instead, the term ‘network’ functions as a precarious reminder of the mediated nature of both reality and philosophy, thereby serving to ward off the possibility of a single fundamental term from which ontological inquiry can begin. Furthermore, all networks, Vitale argues, regardless of the manner in which they are reified and subsequently understood in terms of such hypostatic models, rely upon robustness, which Vitale defines as an ‘increase in complexity’ that should be understood in terms of ‘quality, quantity, quantity of qualities, and quality of quantities,’ terms that, on Vitale’s account, involve a general reciprocity, since ‘robustness’ is always ‘ecological and sustainable in regards to its [networked] contexts’ (151).
Networkologies is thus committed both to an exhaustive speculative ontology—by which all entities or phenomena, from atmospheric environments to humans, are posited as networks—and to a radically post-foundational and non-metaphysical (at least conceived in its traditional vein) commitment to philosophy’s groundlessness and its mediation by way of other disciplines and discourses. Stating that, ontologically speaking, ‘it is all networks, all the way down, simply of differing sorts’, Vitale thus appears to reject the pathos of finitude that is characteristic of much post-Heideggerian philosophy. But, on the other hand, he affirms what appears to be a radically hermeneutic approach to the question of networks, stating that the emphasis placed on networks as the ontological structure of reality ‘does not produce anything like a single networkology, but rather, only ever an increase refraction of networkologies’ (17, 180). There is, therefore, a sense in which Vitale’s project appears to be caught between two conflicting philosophical maneuvers, insofar as Networkologies is both an attempt to provide a post-Kantian speculative ontological account that absolutely affirms the univocity of ‘networks’—not unlike the speculative projects of contemporary philosophers such as Graham Harman (Tool Being; Quadruple) and Levi Bryant (Democracy)—and a rejection of the very fixity and assurance that one typically expects of an ontological account, deferring to the networks of conversations that could potentially emerge out of the broader networkologies project instead. Since, in Vitale’s view, there are simply networks ‘all the way down’, the world cannot be discussed as self-identical and must instead be grasped as distributed and mediated:
If the world is fundamentally self-differing, any attempt to fully grasp any of its aspects, or even the whole of it, will lead to frustration, for any such attempt will ultimately be incomplete, incoherent, or inconsistent with the way any and all aspects of the world differ from themselves in the present, past, or future. (180)
While Vitale absolutely affirms a kind of ontological pluralism, then, one that sees mathematics, the natural sciences, religion, aesthetics, and various other disciplines as all being adjacent and mutually inclusive, such a pluralism is itself grounded in a of fundamental ontology of sorts. So while Vitale is able to start with thought’s mediations, and possible remediation, by all manner of disciplines and discourses, the primacy of speculative ontology to such disciplines is once again—perhaps unavoidably—affirmed. And while he affirms the productive status of philosophy, viewing it as an active site for the production of concepts as opposed to merely the discourse that locates prior natural structures, the primacy of a creative speculative ontology is left largely unperturbed. As Vitale states, until we arrive at ‘a new way of describing the world’ we are supposedly left with the ‘pessimistic embrace of the incoherence of self-deconstructing skepticism, the defensive strategies of fanatical traditionalist incompletion, or various forms of cynical inconsistency’ (80). Therefore, though the networkological project is indeed discussed by Vitale as being anti-foundational the seemingly endless detours through topics as varied as economics, erotics, nothingness, and panpsychism reveal a desire to overcome ‘the need to separate philosophy, theology, and science’ by locating each of these disciplines within the ontological structure of the network (204).
Consequently, the question that both Crocker’s and Vitale’s texts raise is that of the appropriateness of beginning with philosophy—whether it is the critical reevaluation of a key figure such as Bergson, or the attempt at a novel piece of speculative ontology—when the ultimate goal of the project is to affirm the primacy of mediation, and, in a certain sense, an ethics of approaching modern thinking in media res. That is to say that, while both texts are cogent and thought provoking, they both, in their own ways, place the question of the proper beginning for thought as being more significant than an actual engagement with things—both texts begin perhaps more ab ovo than in media res. Perhaps this is one of the limitations of the genre of ‘crisis philosophy’ itself. In proposing, or perhaps presupposing, that modernity must be viewed in terms of a crisis of thought that requires a radical new beginning for thought, crisis philosophy must to some extent bear the burden of having to attend to the question of the grounds of this ‘correctness’. In so doing, it withdraws, to some extent, from our mediation or being-with things, precisely as the affirmation of the middle is declared.
Perhaps, then, the question of the dominance of reason, which remains the legacy of crisis philosophy, and the almost anxious tenor of the question, carries with it the risk of ultimately abolishing the middle so as to make room for a metaphysics of media or a networkology. To note this risk is not to propose a return to a naïve empiricism, to insist that we should merely discuss things, or that the kind of philosophical considerations that Crocker and Vitale explore are too abstract and that we should approach things in a somehow more immediate way. Instead, it is merely to suggest that at the moment of beginning, we could begin in media res, amongst things already and attending to the singular ways in which they can reveal themselves to us. Indeed, the late-Heidegger in particular seemed to favour this mode of questioning greatly, and many of his richest philosophical insights occur in these later works in the form of meditations on jugs, paintings, bridges, clocks, and a plethora of other things that we are already meaningfully caught up with, which is to say, mediated by. However, and as Crocker indicates, both Heidegger and Bergson were opposed to many forms of mediation, and didn’t care to engage with them, due to their prior commitments to the state of modernity as crisis. Surely the best way to overcome our reductive tendencies in thinking is therefore to try to be open to things, as opposed to beginning from certain ontological foundations, no matter how radically they are conceived.
Notes
1. See, for example, Ray Brassier’s recent lecture ‘Bergson, Lived Experience, and the Myth of the Given’ and Benjamin Noy’s recent talk ‘The Poverty of Vitalism’, both of which repeat the critique of the vitalist enterprise implied in their respective works Nihil Unbound and The Persistence of the Negative. #back
2. The term ‘hyperstition’ was popularized by the academics of the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU), an experimental research group prominently active in the nineteen-nineties based at Warwick University in the United Kingdom. As is stated in CCRU 1997-2003, a collection of the group’s collaborative writings, hyperstition is defined in terms of fictions that come to produce in the real the very effects that they describe, thereby problematizing clear distinctions between ‘fiction’ and ‘reality’ and emphasizing the capacity of ‘fiction’ to invoke change (27). #back
References
Bergson, Henri. Time and Freewill: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F. L. Pogson. New York: Dover Publications, 2001.
Brassier, Ray. ‘Bergson, Lived Experience, and the Myth of the Given’ [Lecture]. Zagreb. June. 2011.
Brassier, Ray. Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Bryant, Levi. The Democracy of Objects. Michigan: Michigan Publishing, 2011.
Crocker, Stephen. Bergson and the Metaphysics of Media. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2013.
Harman, Graham. Tool Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. Chicago: Open Court, 2002.
Harman, Graham. The Quadruple Object. Washington: Zero Books, 2011.
Heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Henry, Michel. Barbarism, trans. Scott Davidson. London: Continuum, 2012.
Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
Noys, Benjamin. The Persistence of the Negative: A Critique of Contemporary Contintental Theory. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.
Noys, Bejamin. ‘The Poverty of Vitalism’ [Lecture]. Zagreb. June. 2011.
Vitale, Christopher. Networkologies: A philosophy of Networks for a Hyperconnected Age—A Manifesto. Washington: Zero Books, 2014.
Ctrl-Z: New Media Philosophy
ISSN 2200-8616