Exploring Augmented Reality
—On Users and Rewiring the Senses
All that is Visible must grow beyond itself and extend into the Realm of the Invisible
—Tron (1982)
Augmented reality (AR) is already a part of existing consumer media technology and is particularly accessible to smartphone users. We can travel to Berlin and see a digital Berlin Wall dividing the city. We can visit the MoMA and take part in an art exhibition that is visible only to users of AR. We can even kill virtual cockroaches to cure our phobias. AR changes the way we experience our environment. As Ronald T. Azuma notes, augmented reality ‘allows the user to see the real world, with virtual objects superimposed upon or composited with the real world’ (‘Survey’, 356). Here I will show how this change takes place and how users’ subjectivities are produced by this new technology.
Through augmented reality we enter a world where ‘[m]edia determine our situation’, as Friedrich Kittler (Gramophone, xxxix) famously argues. When media determine our situation they also determine our subjectivity, insofar as using these technologies requires users to adapt to different interfaces, functions and patterns of usage. Importantly, then, AR does not only show the surroundings in a new way but it also begins to modulate the ways in which users perceive, think and act in these surroundings. It is a media technology that ‘re-wires’ users’ senses and thought patterns, capitalising on the potentialities of the body and mind (Parikka, What, 74). To this extent, the content of what is seen through AR technology is subordinate to the potentiality of objects and experiences and, ultimately, of the user subjectivities that these ‘realities’ are capable of producing.
For this reason, AR technology needs to be read in two different but conjoined contexts. The first context is the long history of modern media as psychotechnologies. Augmented reality may thus be positioned in a continuum of audiovisual technologies, which have for a long time been regarded as capable of modulating thoughts, affects, attention and perception. (Kittler, Optical, 175; Parikka, What, 73-5.) The second context, related to the first, is the emergence of an ‘attention economy’ since the 1970s and the mediated means for controlling and capturing attention that have developed alongside the ‘digital economy’ (Terranova, ‘Attention’). By analysing augmented reality in these contexts I will argue that, in order to explore AR, users must adapt to this immersive technology and accept its aesthetico-epistemological frame, which conditions what can and cannot be perceived.
Reality Browser
The example of augmented reality to be explored here is the Layar Reality Browser, created in the Netherlands in 2007 and available since 2009 for smartphones with iOS, Android or Symbian operating systems.1 The platform is free for developers to use and build upon. Currently Layar is the world’s leading mobile AR platform with thousands of developers and content layers, and over 10 million installs (Layar, ‘What’; Layar, ‘The Layar’). The Layar premise is that the ‘online’ and ‘offline’ worlds can be merged by superimposing over the physical environment layers of information and menus of interaction pulled from digital information sources and architectures. The platform provides access to over 3,000 different layers of reality, ranging from commercial products to art projects and games. One layer provides the user with Wikipedia information about neighbouring buildings, for example; another layer points out places to eat; yet another assists with locating nearby businesses. These layers can be accessed only through augmented reality and are presented on the screen of the mobile device.
As the company’s promotional material explains:
Layar works by using a combination of the mobile phone’s camera, GPS, compass, accelerometer and a mobile Internet connection. The camera captures the world as seen through its lens and shows it on the screen. The GPS determines the exact location and the compass and accelerometer the field of view. Based on these sensors and the selected layer, digital information is retrieved over a mobile Internet connection and augmented on top of the camera view. (Layar, ‘How’)
For example, you are standing in Pariser Platz in Berlin, admiring the Brandenburg Gate and the surrounding scenery. If you had been there 30 years earlier you would have seen the Berlin Wall standing just west of the gate and dividing the square. Now you pick up your phone, open the Layar Reality Browser, choose the Berlin Wall 3D layer and point towards the Gate. Two things happen simultaneously. Firstly you see the Brandenburg Gate and its surroundings through the camera, as you would with a naked eye. But secondly there is a data layer added which shows you the Berlin wall as it was 30 years ago. Choose another layer—the local search layer, for example—and you see not the wall but information about the local cafes and tourist shops.
Berlin Wall 3D as shown on the Hoppala website. © Hoppala.
Layar Reality Browser is the main interface to augmented reality. There are literally thousands of coded layers of reality to choose from, each disconnecting users from their environment in order to connect them with another.
Augmented reality technology enables the enhancement of real world objects with digital information, and it’s Layar’s goal to make this accessible for everyone. Layers on the Layar platform include various types of engaging experiences, complete with interactive and immersive features like 3D objects and animation. (Layar, ‘The Layar’)
AR is described here as ‘accessible’, ‘engaging’ and ‘immersive’. In other words it creates a sense of belonging. In her analysis of blogging, Jodi Dean (Blog, 83) argues that belonging to something is not as important as the feeling of belonging in general. It is only due to belonging that we can be affected. This affection by the feeling of belonging surpasses, for example, the feeling of being affected by the content of communication. In augmented reality in particular the question of belonging seems to be essential.
Augmented reality creates a state of exception from how we would perceive the environment without the aid of software.This exception has a topological structure of a certain type, which Giorgio Agamben has described as a feeling of ‘[b]eing outside and yet belonging’ (State, 35). Quite clearly, Layar works simultaneously both outside the environment (connected to global networks and databases) and yet within it (deriving geolocated information). For its users, it is a screen through which the environment is expressed. It frames the world of chaos, territorialises it, gives it more measurable, calculable and mappable features. It intervenes within the multiplicity of events and brings them (to) order (Deleuze, The Fold, 76).
But as Tiziana Terranova argues, ‘the informational dimension of communication seems to implicate a production of reality in a way that does not only involve our capacity to signify—that is, to know the world through a system of signs’ (Network, 19). According to Terranova, that is, information produces realities that also organise perception and produce bodily habits. When Terranova says that information ‘works with forms of distracted perception by modulating the organization of a physical environment’ (ibid.), she could be addressing augmented reality directly. In other words, AR regulates and orientates not only what we see and where we are but also how our bodies may become affected by ‘our’ surroundings (Grosz, Chaos, 15-16); our being-outside-and-yet-belonging-to augmented reality derives, it would seem, from a mode of perception that is fundamentally distracted and captured (see also Gazzard, ‘Location’, 416).
By no means is AR the first or only media technology to rely on these rewirings of the senses. For example, one of the pioneers of game studies—surrealist philosopher Roger Caillois—has noted that bodily manipulation and sensory affection can have the effect of immersing players within the world of the games (see Man). These games, he writes, ‘momentarily destroy the stability of perception and inflict a kind of voluptuous panic upon an otherwise lucid mind’ (ibid., 23). In such off-screen actions as spinning, waltzing and the Danza de los Voladores (Dance of the Flyers, an ancient Mesoamerican ritual still performed in parts of Mexico today), the physical movement of the body results in the distraction of perception. Caillois describes this state as ilinx: the state in which a participant surrenders ‘to a kind of spasm, seizure, or shock which destroys reality with sovereign brusqueness’ (ibid.).
Similarly, augmented reality distracts our perception to produce a new attentiveness that connects users with another mode of reality. In AR the body is situated according to a device connected to a network, a device belonging simultaneously to the environment and yet connected to an outside milieu of information. Together they form a new mediated environment that subsumes the subject. A comprehensive change in perspective due to augmented reality emerges.
According to Elizabeth Grosz (Architecture, 37) coherent identity needs a body where the subjectivity is anchored. This body is the source of perception. It provides a perspective to a world. However, in AR, it seems that the point of view is not dependent on the body of the perceiving subject—at least, not exclusively. The subject does not direct her point of view to the world like a ‘flashlight illuminating a dark world’ (Bogue, Deleuze, 35) but vice versa. A ‘subject will be what comes to the point of view, or rather what remains in the point of view’, as Deleuze puts it (The Fold, 19). Hence augmented reality is a highlighted version of an already pre-illuminated world; it subsumes the subject and hands over the world as a collection of hotspots.
Not only does exploring AR recall Caillois’ ‘ilinx’, but it also resembles a mental condition that Caillois analysed (after Pierre Janet) as ‘psyhcasthenia’ in his ‘Mimicry and the Legendary Psychasthenia’, published in 1935. Psychasthenia is a form of psychosis, which Grosz has described as occurring ‘when the boundaries of personal identity are collapsed and the subject is no longer able to distinguish what is inside from what is outside, what is self and what is other’ (Architecture, 20). According to Caillois schizophrenics have described it as a disturbance of relation between space and personality:
when asked where they are, schizophrenics invariably reply, I know where I am, but I don’t feel that I am where I am. For dispossessed minds such as these, space seems to constitute a will to devour. Space chases, entraps and digests them in a huge process of phagocytocis. Then it ultimately takes their place. (‘Mimicry’, 100)
In psychasthenia, the subject does not know where to place itself. Such subjects feel disconnected from the environment, feeling connected instead to a devouring space that swallows them inside providing a new sense of experience. While the experience is an effect of mental disorder, the feeling it produces is also corporeal. The perspective of the subject changes; it is not anchored in perception, but on the contrary the subject becomes an object of perception from an external position. Indeed, the subject cannot grasp its environment intentionally—the subject itself is grasped and swallowed by the environment. Consequently the cognitive subject is re-corporalised by its environment. In psychasthenia it is the environment that produces the subject and not the other way around (Caillois, ‘Mimicry’.)
Arguably, AR offers us an experience that is parallel to the state described by Caillois. What is implied here again is a sort of voluntary act of losing the ‘I’ and letting the digital environment fold the user inside its realm. Both augmented reality and psychasthenia are states whereby the user is overtaken by an environment and these states are conceived through manipulation of perception and the focal point. The Layar Reality Browser, for example, may be said to take over vision and to alter the viewing position.
In augmented reality, the user becomes affected by the environment. The concept of psychasthenia helps us to understand that not only is AR a digital re-construction of our environment, but it also captures our perception. It indicates a possibility of digital media having the capacity to ‘alert us to that which was previously unable to be sensed—with the obvious corollary that certain objects can no longer be sensed—so producing a potential to generate new kinds of charm’ (Thrift, ‘Understanding’, 295).
Reality Vision
Since the 1970s attention has been seen as an asset needing to be captured and allocated efficiently amidst an overabundance of information (Simon, ‘Designing’, 40-1). The development of an ‘economics of attention’ can be seen as corresponding to the shift towards immaterial capitalism and as recognising, especially, the role of digital media in this shift (Terranova, ‘Attention’, 2). The overflow of information on the Internet has made attention a property which companies and corporations want and value (Goldhaber, ‘The Attention’). As such attention is immaterial capital: its value is not in the end products, but in the process of finding and being found.
Perhaps the most evident example of the connection between an attention economy and AR is manifested in the Layar Vision feature of the Layar application. Using Layar Vision is simple. According to the Layar promotional video, ‘Layar Vision allows the creation of layers and applications that recognize real world objects and display digital AR experiences on top of them’.
Layar Vision Explained, 2011 © Layar
The user points the camera towards an object. If the object is preloaded into the application, Layar Vision can recognise it and provide further information or opportunities for online interaction linked to that object. For example, the promotional video shows a man sitting in a restaurant and looking at the menu. Text on the menu reads, ‘Scan this and choose our next happy hour special!’ When the man uses Layar Vision to ‘scan’ the menu, the screen on the phone displays the text, ‘Choose your favorite! Strawberry, Lemon, Melon, Passion Fruit’. But while Layar Vision could, in practice, recognise anything, the video’s depiction of the program in terms of commercial use should not go unnoticed:
The commercial uses of augmented reality, Introducing Layar Vision, 2011 © Layar
Finding and being found, as essential features of an attention economy, condition ways of understanding capitalism, especially capitalism that operates in the regimes of desire. While finding and being found might suggest otherwise, desire must not be understood in terms of lack. Instead of being a ‘fantasy of what we lack’, as Eugene Holland puts it, desire is ‘the physical and corporeal production of what we want’ (‘Desire’, 65). Value, then, is detached from the desired object and invested instead in the process of desiring as a constitutive force. What desire produces are new connections, and in these connections desire becomes a social force enhancing the power of bodies connected (Ross, ‘Desire’, 63).
Economic psychology (see Tarde, ‘Economic’) or desiring-production (see Deleuze & Guattari, Anti-Oedipus) describes the ideas of desire and affection as the basis of economies. Underneath abstract economic concepts there is always a layer of sensations and feelings that make economies engaging (Tarde, ‘Economic’, 630). They work on an affective level, arousing passions and building up fevers (Latour & Lépinay, Science, 3). These affective needs and desires are economic motors; they are provoked in encounters with the environment and objects, and in social contacts with other people (Tarde ‘Economic’, 637). In other words, economic psychology (or desiring-production) needs and wants subjects that are no longer driven by consciously motivated motor actions, but are defined in relation to the affects they can trigger (see Pisters, ‘Delirium’, 114).
This level of affects, intensities and rhythms from which the relations between us and the environment begins is the same level where AR operates. These sensory relations do not pre-exist the subject and the object, but take effect in the moment when new assemblages are created (Parikka, Insect, 110). Affects and desiring-production in augmented reality appear in a very practical and material sense: they appear in AR’s ways of controlling perception and producing particular desires through the aesthetico-epistemological frame of the software.
Such a relation can be further elaborated with ideas of different perceptual worlds written by early twentieth-century biologist Jacob von Uexküll. While Uexküll was a biologist, his ideas point towards an interesting philosophy that is turned, in the writings of Parikka (Insect), into a practical theory of media. What is interesting is that Uexküll understands animals to live in mediated environments. A small insect called the tick is a key figure here. Uexküll writes how the female tick after mating climbs to the tip of a twig and there waits for a warm-blooded animal to arrive. The eyeless tick uses the photosensitivity of her skin to spot the mammal closing by. The smell of butyric acid coming from the skin glands of the mammal is the hotspot for the tick, which then drops from her twig in order to hit the animal skin. The temperature of the platform on which the tick has landed reveals to her whether or not her landing was on target. If she has landed on the animal she penetrates the skin and starts sucking the warm blood. After eating the tick drops herself from the animal, lays her eggs and dies (Uexküll, ‘Stroll’, 320-1.)
This small creature opens an understanding of two different views of the world, which Uexküll calls Umgebung and Umwelt. Umgebung is the objective space inhabited by living beings, while Umwelt is the environment-world comprised of hotspots, which interest the animal and which the animal uses in order to navigate in the world. Consequently Uexküll proposes as a ‘principle of Umwelt theory’ that ‘all animals, from the simplest to the most complex, are fitted into their unique worlds with equal completeness. A simple world corresponds to a simple animal, a well-articulated world to a complex one’ (ibid., 324). It is evident that Uexküll is not interested in describing the Umgebung. It exists but we do not perceive it. What we understand as an environment is the Umwelt, a world produced by different senses.
An important point in the context of augmented reality is the possibility of different layers of reality that we see corresponding to the Layar application. Paraphrasing Agamben (Open, 40), too often we believe in a single world in which all living beings are situated. What Uexküll shows us is that there is a corresponding world for each entity: the world of the tick, the world of an amoeba or the world of a human. Now the catch is that Uexküll does not understand this relation solely from a phenomenological perspective. The environment-world of Umwelt is not a mental image of the perceiver; instead we are talking about the potentialities of mediated realities that resonate with the body and senses of the perceiver.
When AR re-locates perceiving bodies within the environment, the bodies also become activated by hotspots, marks and carriers of signification. In the Layar application there are two different ways that this guiding is conceived. The first model is of course the Layar Vision as explained above: there is a machine of information that breaks the camera view when it spots something that has been encoded into its database. Through pre-encodings the world is turned into hotspots that lure and grasp viewpoints:
Layar: Impactful Augmented Reality in Your Everyday Life (2011) © Layar
However, and this is the second model, it is not only the camera view that is captured by hotspots. Equally the hotspots made visible inside AR capture the user’s view. In fact there is a double re-focusing of attention and perception that takes place. On the one hand, as argued by Gazzard (‘Location’), the user’s focus is captured by the screen, which provides a new viewpoint to the surroundings through which the user passes. This is the capture of the flow of perception. On the other hand, augmented reality also captures the breaks of perception by providing hotspots to connect and associate with. Exploring augmented reality means navigating according to new signs and signifiers (see Deleuze, ‘Two’,13). Depending on the selected layer of reality, the screen is filled with restaurants and opening hours, people tweeting nearby, or foursquare check-in venues, for example. These are hotspots that grasp and lure users and simultaneously transform them into paranoid subjects navigating according to a relentless system of signs. These signs are like warm-blooded mammals for the tick provoking sensory reactions, affecting and guiding AR users for consuming.
When we become assimilated to augmented reality and let it control our focus and guide our senses, we enter a regime of new stimulants, affects and desires. Like a tick searching for blood, the environment arouses our senses too. However, when we start finding things in AR, we ourselves are likewise found (see Elmer ‘Locative’). To continue the tick metaphor, we become susceptible to being blood-sucked. Hotspots are mechanisms of capturing and directing our desires. The environment is replaced by a regime of digital signs that are routinely produced according to a certain logic of capitalism. You point towards a can of Pringles; the software recognises the can and prompts you to shop for it online. In this way, AR affirms what Rosi Braidotti has called a schizophrenic double pull: we are faced with a technology that is new and could offer us new experiences, but simultaneously it folds back to the same old systems of value production peculiar to consumer capitalism (Transpositions, 2).
Conclusion: In Reality
According to Patricia Pisters a major transformation to theories of audio-visual culture is underway, and this change is located somewhere between the categories of the visible and the invisible (‘Delirium’, 112-15). She uses psychoanalytic film theory as an example of the former. A common approach for psychoanalytic film theory, according to Pisters, is that films are representations of a recorded reality, of what is deemed visible. In contrast, Pisters points out that recent, Deleuzian theories of cinema demand
that we no longer consider cinema an ‘illusion of reality’ but rather a ‘reality of illusion’. It involves a shift from considering cinema and the spectator as a ‘disembodied eye’ (defined by the look and the gaze, desire and identification) to considering cinema and the spectator as an embodied brain (defined by perceptions—even illusory ones—, selections—even random ones—, memories—even fake ones—, imaginations, suggestions and above all emotions as pure affect). (Ibid., 113-14)
These theories of the invisible are, for Pisters, connected to contemporary audio-visual culture in a very literal sense. Cinema for example tells stories of madness, but also adopts brain-disorder-like storytelling as its form and function.
Augmented reality can be seen to partake in this continuum and to be developing it further. As I have argued, AR invites its users to adapt to a subject position that once was described as psychotic. This happens in two ways. Firstly augmented reality calls for a subjectivity that can adapt to a media-technological viewpoint that subsumes the subject. Secondly, users of AR need to believe in the signs they see on the screen and let them affect and guide their senses. Henceforth reality as such, if it ever existed, becomes unattainable due to digital manipulation; behind one layer there is always another layer, behind a sign there is another sign.
While in psychiatry the states of psychosis refer to abnormal states of mind and loss of contact with reality, in the context of AR they become preferred states of being. In fact, this condition, mediated via the aesthetico-epistemological framework, is perfect for contemporary capitalism. It can be endlessly programmed and re-programmed to tease out new forms of perception. When perception becomes augmented it is simultaneously de-territorialised, taken away from us (as perceiving subjects) and the environment (as something being perceived) and re-territorialised and captured within commercial hotspots and the potentials of the digital environment.
Now, for many, AR is little more than a curiosity among new media technologies. The Layar Reality Browser, for example, is considered a pioneer in its field, but one that is still developing. Nobody knows what its future applications might be. Based on my analysis, however, a more general claim on the level of our contemporary network culture can be made: perception is only one aspect that our network culture wants to capture. What the analysis of augmented reality makes visible as psychotic subject positions and affective sign regimes, is in fact invisibly present in the very mundane practices of our daily lives. The reference here is to such concepts as the ubiquitous Internet, network culture and information society. All discourses on networks and networking are based on connections, disconnections and re-connections, affects and sensations. Logging into social networks, paying for things with credit cards and running virtual courses for learning are in a way all examples of augmented reality. To operate in this reality, to be completely connected to information networks, a particular subjectivity is demanded and an epistemological frame that makes us believe in things that circulate as binary codes is needed. Accordingly, there is always a degree of ‘madness’ in our contemporary network culture that we must adapt to.
Notes
I would like to thank Professor Jukka Sihvonen, Dr Jussi Parikka and Dr Ilona Hongisto for their helpful advice during the process of writing this article.
1. The discussion here is based on versions 5.0 and 6.0 of the Layar application launched in 2011 and on the documentation pertaining to these versions. As an emerging technology under development, Layar has undergone various changes since its public launch. Rather than documenting the features of each and every version, this analysis seeks to identify those theoretical principles related to using AR that seem to endure through different updates and technical developments. #back
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